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LETTER TO THE EDITOR
Diagnosing embodiment should become part of our repertoire
A response to “It’s not a part of me, but it is what it is”: the struggle of becoming en-
wheeled after spinal cord injury
Dear Editor,
It is with great interest that we read the article of Monforte
and colleagues [1], putting forward an intrinsic case study of a
patient with spinal cord injury (SCI) and his struggle of becoming
so called “en-wheeled". Especially interesting was the patient’s
perspective on cyborg identity in relation to other technologies.
The authors mention that while “Patrick neglected the possibility
of incorporating the wheelchair” [1, p.3 ], it did not keep him
from accepting or even celebrating the plates and screws stabiliz-
ing his spinal column. They elaborate by stating that this accept-
ance “signals the intricate nature of cyborgification, and the utility
of the continuum for sensing the conflicts, paradoxes and nuan-
ces that enwheelment, and more broadly cyborgification, entails”
[1, p.5]. We found this description of a continuum very striking, as
it reminded us of comparisons our study participants have made
between incorporating a wheelchair versus a neural implant.
The work of our group centers around the development and
application of electrical neural implants in patients with SCI with
the ultimate purpose of motor recovery. We have been interview-
ing our patients on their perspectives on tool embodiment, includ-
ing discussing the possibility of tool incorporation of different
(hypothetical) tools such as a wheelchair or a neural implant.
Interestingly, several of our patients answered their questions from
a perspective focused on (regain of) functionality. While most
patients whole-heartedly considered their wheelchair to be part of
their body (“these wheels are my legs”), they emphasized the diffi-
culty envisioning the same level of embodiment for a neural
implant, which in their opinion still had to proof its functionality.
From a perspective of phenomenological embodiment [2], we
explain these answers by using the concept of “tool transparancy”.
In order for a tool to be truly part of a user’s bodily representation
(body schema), the focus on the tool itself, the user-tool interface
so-to-say, needs to become transparent. By losing this opacity, we
open up room for a focus on the user-environment interface
instead, and as such a tool can become truly incorporated [2,3].
According to our patients, functionality clearly appeared to be a
facilitating factor for this transparency. A wheelchair which is truly
functional (i.e., allowing for mobility), can become more easily
transparent than a wheelchair with a faulty wheel getting stuck at
uneven surfaces, and a such drawing constant attention to itself. A
multitude of other factors can facilitate this transparency as well
[2], many of which are mostly patient-dependent, but also time-
dependent, emphasizing the fluidity of the concept, which the
authors mention as well: “Across time, a person can move across
the continuum without following a predetermined order” [1, p.5].
Lastly, the authors very justly mention that theories on embodi-
ment can help “clients to incorporate assistive technologies in
ways that support flourishing” [1, p.5]. What we think would facili-
tate this step from theoretical frameworks to clinical application, is
considering embodiment as much a part of the healing process as
any other biological parameter requiring diagnostics. In a previous
paper we have dubbed this the “patient transparency diagnosis”
(PTD) [2], which aims to determine the patient’s current and
desired level of embodiment. Not with the aim to freeze a patient’s
experience of embodiment in time, but rather to allow for the two-
sided reflection that is required to stay as open-minded and fluid
throughout the embodiment process, as the concept itself is.
Diagnosing incorporation, embodiment, transparency or en-wheel-
ment, should be as much a part of our repertoire as the diagnostic
process of the underlying diseases already are.
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